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The Place of America 
in an Era of Postcolonial Imperialism 
S U S I E O ' B R I E N 
IN AUGUST 1 9 6 2 , the Times Literary Supplement published the 
second of two special summer issues on the newly emergent 
literatures f rom the Commonwealth. While the tone of some 
of the reviews recalls Samuel Johnson's pronouncement o n 
women's preaching—that, like a dog walking on its h i n d legs, it 
is remarkable not because it is done well , but because it is done at 
a l l—the general response to the new Commonwealth literatures 
was one of indulgent approval. The overall tone of the issue was 
most strongly conveyed, however, i n a solemn concluding re-
minder to reviewers that 
the future o f English . . . is still largely in our own hands, in spite o f 
the surprising developments abroad, unless we in tend to abdicate 
responsibility. . . . We are under an obl igat ion to criticize these 
[emergent] literatures, with understanding but wi thout leniency, 
and to accept them for what they a r e — i n t e g r a l parts o f a wor ld 
l i terature in English. But our duty is our advantage: we shall find the 
language itself refreshed by its new uses and our own literature 
stimulated by other examples. Macaulay would have urged us to seize 
on the possibilities being offered ahead. 
("The Give and Take o f Engl ish" 568) 
The imprimatur of Macaulay works was intended as a reassuring 
symbolic reminder of Britain's prevailing authority i n cultural 
matters—an authority which was generally upheld both by the 
popular literary press and by university English departments 
throughout the Commonwealth for the better part of the next 
two decades. 1 
By the early 1990s, the situation had changed dramatically, 
as reflected i n an article which appeared i n 1 9 9 3 i n Time— 
significando an American, rather than an English w e e k l y — 
ARIEL: A Review of International English Literature, 29:2, Apr i l 1998 
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titled "The Empire Writes Back." In that article, journalist Pico 
Iyer hails the inauguration of"a new "polyculturai" order, observ-
ing that "Britain's former colonies have begun to capture the very 
heart of English literature, while transforming the language with 
bright colors and strange cadences and foreign eyes" (54). This 
image of the ravishment of English literature becomes the hall-
mark of Iyer's triumphant postcolonialism, in which the progres-
sive movement from monologism to multiplicity, f rom tyranny to 
freedom, from English nationalism to decentred globalism is 
accompanied by the noisy explosion of the British canon. 
Significantly quiet i n the scene depicted by Iyer is the US, 
which surely should be mentioned in the narrative of English 
literary rebell ion. L o n g before the "closed and almost airless 
rooms of English literature" (57) were penetrated by writers 
from India, Nigeria, Tr inidad, and Canada, American literature 
had succeeded in not only gaining entry, but in claiming a room 
of its own. Indeed, as Bruce K i n g has observed, the success of 
American writing dur ing the 1960s and 1970s was frequently 
held up as an inspir ing example for other postcolonial cultures, 
for whom it performed the enabling task of 
opening windows and doors, al lowing new kinds o f energy and ideas 
to enter what many writers and intellectuals thought o f as their own 
staid, conservative, colonial societies. . . . In contrast to British gen-
tility and superiority, American culture . . . appeared as a model o f 
vitality, equality, social mobi l i ty and modernizat ion. (146-47) 
In the context of American literature's tradition of opposition-
ality and progressiveness, Iyer's article is striking in its i m p l i c i t — 
and apparently unconscious—assumption of a writing position 
within the heart of English as against the "bright colors" from 
outside. I want to explore the implications of that assumption — 
an assumption which informs not only the New World English 
literature industry described by Iyer, but also the academic dis-
course which supports (as it is in turn supported by) that industry 
— i n order to suggest one way that we might answer the chal-
lenge raised by Peter Huhne in a previous issue of ARIEL, to 
include America in the postcolonial . 2 
The elision of the place of his own writing from Iyer's discus-
sion of "wor ld" literature is perhaps not surprising given the 
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scant attention the U S has received within the dominant aca-
demic formulations which compete under the rubric of literary 
postcolonialism. 3 In what might loosely be designated the T h i r d 
Worldist school of postcolonialism, invoked by critics such as 
Fredric Jameson, 4 a generally nationalist T h i r d W o r l d — d e f i n e d 
as those "countries which have suffered the experience of colo-
nialism and imperial ism" ("Third W o r l d " 67)—is defined i n 
opposition to an explicitly American "West." It is not ultimately 
clear, i n this analysis, "by what these [Third World] nationalisms 
might be replaced except perhaps some global American post-
modernist culture" (65). Jameson posits, i n other words, a na-
tionalistic T h i r d World as against a more or less posinational First 
World , which is nevertheless coterminous with one nat ion—the 
U S . 
In Commonwealth constructions of postcolonialism, the bat-
tle lines are not so clear (see, for instance, Ashcroft et al.). 
Indeed, far f rom def ining itself against what Jameson identifies 
as the dominant power of the twentieth century, the C o m m o n -
wealth model of postcolonialism includes the U S , allowing that 
"perhaps because of its current position of power, and [because 
of] the neo-colonizing role it has played, its post-colonial nature 
has not been generally recognized. But its relationship with the 
metropolitan centre as it evolved over the last two centuries 
has been paradigmatic for post-colonial literatures everywhere" 
(Ashcroft et al. 2 ) . Accord ing to this formulation, the U S is i n the 
paradoxical position of being the exemplar of postcoloniality, 
whose autonomy is maintained, i n part, through its imperial 
dominance of other nations. 
Thus emerges a curious composite representation of the U S as 
at once nowhere and everywhere, neocolonial and paradigmatic 
of the postcolonial nation. What these critical texts demonstrate 
is the extent to which the US , i n all its contradictions, impinges 
on the imaginative construction of the rest of the former colonial 
world. In these contradictions may be found, at the same time, 
at least a partial explanation of why postcolonial criticism of 
the Commonwealth school has tended to sidestep the U S , engag-
ing instead i n what Meaghan Morris has described i n a differ-
ent context as an "obsessive resuscitation of yesterday's bogeys" 
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("Small Serve" 4 7 6 ) . By focusing almost exclusively on the effects 
of British colonialism, such criticism does not simply ignore 
American culture as a legitimate object of critique, but actually 
collaborates i n the mythical construction of the US as a model of 
liberation from the repressive strictures of British tradition. This 
construction is summarized neatly by Donald Pease in the intro-
duction to a special issue of boundary 2 on American literary 
nationalism. The national mythology, as Pease defines it, "inter-
connects an exceptional national subject (American Adam) with 
a representative national scene (Virgin Land) and an exemplary 
national motive (errand into the wilderness)." The biblical refer-
ences here invoke a myth of emancipation wherein the national 
subjects are represented as having been liberated from a tyranni-
cal power. The resulting entity, "Nature's Nat ion , " is made up of 
"citizens [who] believed, by way of the supreme fiction called 
natural law, that the rul ing assumptions of their national com-
pact (Liberty, Equality, Social Justice) could be understood as 
indistinguishable from the sovereign power creative of nature" 
( 4 ) . Invoking the biblical authority of Genesis, this national 
myth ultimately comes to acquire a k ind of scientistic credibility 
based on a simplistic rendering of the principles of Freudian 
psychoanalysis: the American nation becomes the exemplum of 
the chi ld who, in seeking to displace the British father, simul-
taneously loses his innocence and gains the free will that is 
bestowed by the Law of individualism. 
The development metaphor reflects the notion that the U S is a 
nation which is not only founded on humanist principles, but 
may i n fact, as the motto epluribus unum signifies, be conceived of 
as an individual . This metaphorical reduction thus enables the 
construction of a normative framework of "manifest destiny," 
according to which the postcolonial development of the Amer i -
can nation can only be seen as both natural and progressive. The 
invocation of the individual serves, moreover, as a justification 
for the extension of American sovereignty throughout the world: 
if the nation is reducible to the individual American citizen, it is 
also, through the métonymie logic of humanism, expandable 
into the world. "The world , " in this formulation, is both excluded 
from and harnessed into the American vision, as a k ind of pen-
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umbra around the solid core of America or more generously as a 
less-developed extension of the nation itself. 
A vivid illustration of the cultural significance of this formula-
t i o n — a n d of its fundamental difference f rom earlier imperialist 
mythologies—can be found i n the 1 9 8 5 Live A i d project, i n 
which, under the sponsorship of such corporations as A T & T , an 
internationally televised live concert was arranged by British and 
American musicians to raise money for famine victims i n Ethio-
pia. The main thrust of the project is embodied i n the simple, 
inspirational lyric of the American single released i n the same 
year: "We are the world, we are the chi ldren. We are the ones who 
make a brighter day, so let's start giving" ("U.S.A. For Africa") . 
"We," of course, is a slippery term here seeming first to refer to 
everyone and only at the end of the l ine acknowledging that "we" 
are the Americans, within whose power it lies to represent, give to 
and withhold from the rest of the world. 
This rhetorical slipperiness is striking i n its difference f rom 
the (literally) black-and-white clarity of the original British 
single which inaugurated the project of musical aid. While the 
American song invokes the rhetoric of universalism, the English 
version, "Do They Know It's Christmas?" is firmly i f somewhat 
ironically inscribed within the o ld colonialist binaries of "us" and 
" them" and is cast i n a m o o d of self-congratulatory paternalism, 
with an undercurrent of missionary zeal i n the chorus, "Here's to 
you, raise a glass for everyone / Here's to them underneath that 
burning sun / D o they know it's Christmas time at all?" (Band 
A i d ) . In the American song, the discourse of master/slave, col-
onizer/colonized is translated into the Wor ld Bank rhetoric of 
donor and client, conveying the reassuring image of a voluntary 
transaction taking place i n a world of universal freedom and 
equality. 
The Live A i d concert represented the triumphant materializa-
tion of the message contained i n the American song as it suc-
ceeded i n conveying a spectacular image of a global village 
bathed i n the warmth of electronically generated goodwill . 
S imon D u r i n g describes Live A i d as an example of what Gramsci 
calls the "global popular," a product of "the new cultural technol-
ogies that permit visual communicat ion to t r iumph over spatial 
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distance, enabling a genuinely weightless global simultaneity" 
( 3 4 1 ) . The global popular, as D u r i n g goes on to point out, 
appeals to a humanism based not on the traditional (and restric-
tive) notion of the essential dignity of "man," but on the impera-
tive of a universalist consumerism: 
Its general magic relies on the trick by which global markets, technol-
ogies and in format ion flows fuse into a humanism transcending 
national boundaries at the same t ime as, in its clear dependence on 
market ing, it leaves in tatters the idealism and naïve appeal to human 
nature so integral to older humanisms. (342) 
Indeed it is partly through its spectacular transcendence of the 
boundaries of the past—national , technological and epistemo-
l o g i c a ! — that the new humanism seems to possess a liberatory 
potential. 
Whether it also has more menacing impl ica t ions—and 
whether, or to what extent, the menace can be located in one 
particular nation — has been the subject of intense critical de-
bate. Some of the earliest and most prominent participants in 
that debate were the large group of member states of U N E S C O 
who began calling, in the m i d - i 970s , for a New World Informa-
tion and Communications Order. Issued i n 1 9 8 0 , the MacBride 
report, Many Voices, One World, spoke to concerns on the part of 
many developing nations that traffic in the "global village" was 
being controlled and driven exclusively by a few wealthy nations 
—the US in particular. A m o n g its points of critique, the report 
noted that the concept of "free flow" communications, advanced 
most vociferously by the US , has resulted in advantages for those 
nations (such as the US) with the greatest communicat ion re-
sources ( 1 4 1 ) . 5 
The U N E S C O argument echoes those raised by such cultural 
critics as Herbert Schiller,'' who point to the role of multinational 
media corporations, largely based in the U S and given clandes-
tine support by the CIA, as vehicles for the promotion of capital-
ism. The US-dominated corporations work, Schiller argues, to 
secure 
not grudging submission but an open-armed allegiance in the pene-
trated areas, by identi fying the American presence with f r e e d o m — 
freedom of trade, f reedom of speech and freedom of enterprise. In 
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short, the emerging imper ia l network o f American economics and 
finance utilizes the communicat ions media for its defense and en-
trenchment wherever it exists already and for its expansion to locales 
where it hopes to become active. (3) 
American media work, in other words, according to a sophisti-
cated variation of Macaulay's formula for colonial education in 
India. Just as an English education serves as the means of incul-
cating i n its subjects the k i n d of quality of m i n d that would make 
them more amenable to colonial "c ivi l izat ion," American cul-
ture, according to this argument, might be seen to construct, on 
a global scale, the k i n d of consumerist subjects required by the 
US's ever-expanding capitalist economy. American culture then 
functions as a direct instrument of its wil l to global dominat ion. 
A n d i n a crude sense this formulation is historically accurate. 
F r o m its earliest forays into the arena of global trade, the U S 
d i d not hesitate to employ whatever means of indoctrination 
were necessary to secure overseas markets. D u r i n g the nation's 
first concerted push for greater commercial activity with Asia, 
Thomas H . Nor ton , an American consular officer i n the Middle 
East, was able to defend aggressive missionary activity i n that area 
by arguing that 
I n a thousand ways they are raising the standard o f morality, o f 
intell igence, or education. . . . Direcdy or indirect ly every phase of 
their work is rapidly paving the way for American commerce. . . . I 
know o f no impor t better adapted to secure the future commercial 
supremacy of the Un i ted States. (Qtd. in Wil l iams 125) 
Fifty years later, i n the midst of what was proudly proclaimed, i n a 
1941 Life editorial, to be "the American Century" ("Golden 
Years"), the U S government needed no convincing of the value 
of "cultural" imports—albeit of a more secular variety. A 1 9 6 6 
report f rom the congressional committee concerned with "Ideo-
logical Operations and Foreign Policy," stressed the role of com-
munications i n winning the C o l d War, arguing that 
the recent increase in inf luence o f the masses o f the people over 
governments, together wi th greater awareness on the part o f leaders 
o f the aspirations o f people . . . has created a new dimension for 
foreign policy operat ion. Certain foreign policy objectives can be 
pursued by deal ing direcdy wi th the people o f foreign countries, 
rather than wi th their governments. Th rough the use o f modern 
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instruments and techniques o f communications it is possible today to 
reach large or inf luent ial segments o f national p o p u l a t i o n s — t o 
in form them, to inf luence their attitudes, and at times perhaps even 
to motivate them to a particular course o f action. These groups, in 
turn, are capable o f exert ing noticeable, even decisive, pressures, on 
their governments. (Qtd. in Schiller, Mass Communications 1 2 ) 7 
The means by which such influence might be wielded turn out to 
be surprisingly prosaic. For example, David Ogilvy, founder of 
the Ogilvy and Mather advertising agency, suggests that Reader's 
Digest "exports the best in American life. . . . In my opin ion , the 
Digest is doing as much as the United States Information Agency 
to win the battle for men's minds" (qtd. in Schiller, Communica-
tion 6 ) . 
Ci t ing this and other compel l ing examples, Schiller makes a 
convincing case for the capacity—and indeed, the conscious 
effort—of American media to transmit an ideological program 
necessary for the upholding of capitalist democracy, creating, in 
the process, a compliant global population with a homogeneous 
set of, not only cars, supermarkets and suburbs, but also, follow-
ing Macaulay, "taste, opinions, morals and intellect." While this 
process exemplifies a particularly powerful and, by now, fairly 
familiar form of cultural imperialism, it does not represent the 
whole story. The neo-Macaulayist formula of cultural influence 
has a number of limitations, two of which I want to concentrate 
on in some depth here." 
The first is the fear, expressed by Schiller and others, of a 
global uniformity imposed by the process of capitalist develop-
ment. Cees Hamelink 's study Cultural Autonomy in Global Com-
munications can be read as a typical example of anti-capitalist 
critique which focuses on the issue of cultural homogenization. 
Hamel ink illustrates the phenomenon through a series of recol-
lections of personal experiences of the "international scene": 
In a Mexican village the tradit ional r i tual dance precedes a soccer 
match, but the performance features a gigantic Coca-Cola b o t t l e . . . . 
In Singapore, a band dressed in tradit ional Malay costume offers a 
heart-breaking imitat ion o f Fats D o m i n o . . . . For starving chi ldren in 
the Brazilian city o f Recife, to have a Barbie dol l seems more impor-
tant than having food. (2) 
Hamel ink cites these examples as evidence of the unprece-
dented level of "cultural synchronization" which has accom-
THE PLACE OF AMERICA 167 
panied the global advance of capitalism and observes ominously 
that "never before has the process of cultural influence pro-
ceeded so subtly, without any b lood being shed and with the 
receiving culture thinking it had sought such cultural influence" 
(4) . Hamel ink 's conclusions have been challenged by critics 
such as J o h n Toml inson o n a number of grounds, not least of 
which is the heavy undercurrent of paternalism that informs his 
concern. As Toml inson dryly notes, "any critique which bases 
itself i n the idea that cultural dominat ion is taking place 'behind 
people's backs' is heading for trouble" ( 1 1 0 ) . The distinction 
between the knowing Western observer and the unwily T h i r d 
Wor ld consumer is one which Toml inson cannot finally help 
making himself, however, as he observes that whether or not 
cultural synchronization is a bad thing depends where the indi -
vidual are standing. "It is difficult to object to global homogenisa-
t ion," Toml inson writes, 
without falling back on the simple intuition that it is a good thing that 
there is variety in cultures. But then we have to ask, a good thing for 
whom? Who is to enjoy the range of cultural differences? It is not 
difficult to see how this preference for variety might become that of 
the Western global-cultural tourist as much as of the concerned 
anthropologist. (98) 
The idea that what is good for the culturally literate Westerner is 
not good for the more l imited T h i r d Wor ld subject comes dan-
gerously close to reifying the split between the West as the 
producer and the T h i r d Wor ld as the subject of knowledge which 
Tomlinson is elsewhere careful to dispel . 9 
What his critique of H a m e l i n k does suggest, however, is that 
cultural heterogeneity cannot be read unproblematically as ei-
ther a corrective to or as a reassuring sign of the ultimate failure 
of cultural imperial ism. Heterogeneity, o n the contrary, operates 
as a vital component within the homogenizing system of capitalist 
development which, l ike the mythology of the American frontier, 
depends on the existence of a limidess number of thresholds of 
alterity, by whose progressive transgression the movement of 
capi ta l—and, by extension, the consumer's ever-expanding 
freedom of choice—is defined. 
O n e of the clearest examples of the successful operation of 
this law is the new "world literature" industry celebrated i n Time. 
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Iyer's article lends support to the argument made in a different 
context by Susan Hawthorne that 
i t is precisely because capitalism depends on the usefulness o f its 
colonies that the work o f [postcolonial] writers just now is do ing well. 
What is the basis o f this "usefulness" ? Western capitalism depends on 
change, or on the i l lusion o f change, to establish a need for (appar-
ently) new goods. (260) 
Thanks to world literature, in other words, "hot spices are enter-
ing English, and tropical birds and sorcerers. . . . World Fic-
tion has expanded our conception of the possible and brought 
wonder into our l iving rooms" (Iyer 56, 57). The appeal of such 
images lies not, as Iyer claims, i n their reflection of a "frontier-
less" world but conversely, in their spectacular capacity to embody, 
in their heterogeneity, the mythological frontier of the post-
colonial , which separates the New W rorld from the O l d . 
In reality, of course, New World global culture is not reducible 
either to the homogenizing force lamented by Schiller nor to 
the heterogeneous carnival celebrated by Iyer; it works rather 
through a productive (in an economic sense) tension between 
these two opposing impulses. Stuart H a l l suggests that contem-
porary processes of globalization are characterized by an em-
phasis on a particular form of heterogeneity which operates both 
within and against an overriding homogenizing force—a force 
he identifies, i n contrast to an earlier, monolithic , and predomi-
nantly British form of hegemony, as essentially American. Ac-
cepting the truism that global mass-culture seems, in one sense, 
to operate through a process of homogenization, H a l l stresses 
not only that the process is never complete, but also that "it does 
not work for completeness." It is not, he goes on to argue, 
attempting to produce l itt le mini-versions of Englishness every-
where, or l i tt le versions o f Americanness. I t is wanting to recognize 
and absorb those differences wi th in the larger, overarching frame-
work o f what is essentially an American conception o f the wor ld . That 
is to say, it is very powerfully located in the increasing and ongoing 
concentration o f culture and other forms o f capital. But it is now a 
form of capital which recognizes that it can only, to use a metaphor, 
rule through other local capitals, rule alongside and in partnership 
with other economic and poli t ical elites. I t does not attempt to 
obliterate them; it operates through them. It has to ho ld the whole 
T H E PLACE OF AMERICA 169 
framework of globalization in place and simultaneously police that 
system: it stage-manages independence within it, so to speak. 
(28-29) 
The k i n d of diversity H a l l is talking about is a powerfully con-
tained one: nominally postcolonial nations are confirmed as free 
and independent states insofar as they u p h o l d an American 
model of democratic capitalism, i n much the same way as branch 
plants and franchises are encouraged to make superficial adapta-
tions to local conditions which wil l ultimately strengthen the 
economic position of the head office to whose policies they 
remain ultimately accountable. 
Perhaps the most obvious model for such an incorporation of 
diversity within homogeneity is the supermarket—that structure 
which is frequently invoked as a symbol of the depressing unifor-
mity of capitalist development. While the external structure of 
the supermarket, both physical and economic, might be uni-
form, its strength is maintained by the variety of goods contained 
within. The "supermarket" vision of the world tolerates—indeed 
promotes—cultural difference insofar as it is attractively pack-
aged, easy to serve and not too shocking to the palate . 1 0 For in 
contemporary Western culture, as H a l l observes, 
the most sophisticated thing is to be in the new exotica. To be at the 
leading edge of modern capitalism is to eat fifteen different cuisines 
in any one week, not to eat o n e . . . . Because if you are just jetting in 
from Tokyo, via Harare, you come in loaded, not with "how every-
thing is the same" but how wonderful it is, that everything is different. 
In one trip around the world, in one weekend, you can see every 
wonder of the ancient world. You take it in as you go by, all in one, 
living with difference, wondering at pluralism, this concentrated 
corporate, over-corporate, over-integrated, over-concentrated, and 
condensed form of economic power which lives culturally through 
difference and which is constantly teasing itself with the pleasures of 
the transgressive Other. ( 3 1 ) 1 1 
Thus the principle of the supermarket is extended into the world 
via the practice of tourism. W h e n the possibility of consuming 
"exotic cuisine" becomes accessible to everyone via the super-
market's democratic ubiquity, the stakes of diversity are raised, so 
that i n order to gain the status attached to the consumption of 
authentic difference, it becomes necessary to move farther afield. 
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A t its most sophisticated, the practice of tourism enables the 
consumption of other cultures while maintaining the il lusion 
that the places one visits emerge from the encounter intact, as 
timeless sites of pure difference. 1 2 O f course, tourism, as Graeme 
Turner has observed, 
is a particularly unl ikely champion o f national difference. The dis-
courses o f tourism are thoroughly internationalised, and operate as 
a means of translating existing cultural differences into a trans-
national code of the exotic, of the leisurely, and of the famil iar; 
a code that results in a consoling crosscultural sameness—what 
Meaghan Morris has called a "consistent indist inct ion." ( 111 ) 
The ability to negotiate that transnational code confers on the 
tourist a form of authority—literally, a "worldliness"—through 
which interpretations of "other" places are validated as objective. 
The tourist thus gains accreditation as a k ind of world expert, 
whose ability to bring alterity home, so to speak, is analogous to 
the skill of the theorist who domesticates far-flung, and often 
unruly, strands of information into a stable and familiar cognitive 
framework. 
Parallels between the activities of the tourist and the theorist 
have been identified already and cast in different lights ranging 
from the critical to the celebratory. 1 : i If nothing else, this con-
junct ion points to a general agreement about the significance of 
both tourism and theory as contemporary world-shaping pro-
cesses. I want now to focus on the latter issue—the role of theory 
in the contemporary global economy—and in so doing to ad-
dress what I see as the second major l imitation of Schiller's 
approach to cultural imperial ism. The first, discussed above, is 
the failure to address the complex function of heterogeneity i n 
capitalist cultural development. The second, related issue is the 
place of the cultural industry in the broader economy. 
In Schiller's formulation, American culture functions essen-
tially as a global vehicle for capitalist values, much in the same 
way as the school worked in the nineteenth century to transmit 
British colonialist values to the outposts of empire. What this 
construction fails to take into account is the extent to which the 
communications industry has increasingly become not just a 
shaping force in , but also a constitutive part of, the capitalist 
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economy. The "recolonization" of the developing world has oc-
curred, as D u r i n g has argued, as the (largely American based) 
industry of " information product ion and transmission comes to 
have better profit rates than manufacturing, service and primary 
industries" (343). Intellectual-property industries, D u r i n g goes 
on to note, "belong disproportionately to the First World : even 
'world music, ' which would seem to be the intellectual property 
of its non-Western creators, is i n fact mainly owned and con-
trolled by the big six music companies" (343). Thus, "culture" 
not only serves to communicate the values of private property; it 
¿5 private property, produced and transmitted through the enter-
tainment industry, through the publishing industry and (per-
haps less lucratively) through the so-called knowledge industries 
of anthropology and literary criticism. Even the corporate sector 
has been overtaken by the information industry, as American 
corporate advisors promote what Jameson describes as "the ex-
port of experts" ("Conversations" 2 6 8 ) . 
T o be a member of the American "expert" class is always to be 
figuratively if not literally "justjetting i n f rom Tokyo, via Harare," 
travelling i n such a way that one's American credentials can be 
momentarily forgotten, casually stuffed i n the back pocket, unti l 
the crucial moment of border crossing when their production 
guarantees an easy passage. Transcending the "ugly" label with 
which the American tourist is sometimes saddled, the American 
expert joins the ranks of what Bruce Cumings terms "intellec-
tuals with no name" (49), roaming freely throughout a border-
less world which turns out to be easily convertible into the 
discursive (and, ultimately, the economic) equivalent of a com-
fortable suburban home. 
A powerful example of the k i n d of structure erected by the 
American knowledge industry to house the world is the M o d e r n 
Language Association, described, not inaccurately, i n a recent 
newsletter as "the international organization i n the fields of lan-
guage, literature and culture" (Gilman 3) . Acknowledging the 
"invisible A" i n the title which definitively locates the organiza-
tion as the " M o d e r n Language Association of America," M L A 
President Sander G i l m a n insists nevertheless that the M L A is 
fundamentally an international organization. "At the end of the 
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twentieth century," he suggests, "the M L A A has evolved into the 
space where scholars throughout the world feel themselves at 
home" ( 3 ) . 
If the identification of the organization as a spare can be seen 
as reflecting, on the one hand, a U t o p i a n desire, on the part of 
Gi lman, and a large number of M L A members, to eliminate 
barriers to cross-cultural communicat ion, it is at the same time 
symptomatic of the forgetfulness that is born of privilege, that 
those barriers still exist, not just between the American "home" 
of the M L A and those other nations whose academics boast M L A 
membership, but also within the organization itself, which, like 
most organizations, looks more like a hierarchy than a "space." 
The external borders of the organization are relatively easy to 
map. The M L A ' s America includes Canada, as Gi lman is quick to 
point out, noting that the organization "has large numbers of 
Canadian as well as Uni ted States members, has twice held its 
convention in Toronto, and has had distinguished Canadian 
presidents" ( 3 ) . If Canadian members of the M L A are occa-
sionally exposed as not quite American, as for example, at the 
1993 M L A Convention in Toronto, when some of them tried to 
buy books with Canadian money, the barriers faced by overseas 
members are more formidable . 1 4 
Notwithstanding the difficulty of getting there, the M L A con-
vention itself is represented by Gi lman as an event of global 
significance, a celebration of the postcolonial cultural order. H e 
remarks on being struck, in South Afr ica recently, "by how impor-
tant South African colleagues felt it was that after the end of 
apartheid and the boycott they could attend the annual confer-
ence" ( 3 ) . If the opportunity to attend the M L A A conference 
might not seem like the most obvious benefit to be realized from 
the end of apartheid, Gi lman makes its significance clear: South 
African publishers and writers, he explains, "saw the M L A A as a 
space to present the 'new' South Afr ica" ( 3 ) . Represented once 
again as a space, the M L A functions here both as a metonym for 
freedom and as a stage on which world events can be "presented" 
for an international/American audience and thus rendered 
meaningful. 
If the M L A A grants an audience to the world, it also operates 
as the venue through which those responses are reified, and 
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subsequently marketed back to the world as authoritative repre-
sentations of global relations. "I was struck," Gi lman observes 
by how very important American publications, inc lud ing those o f the 
MLAA, were to South Afr ican colleagues. These texts enabled them 
again to track the development o f scholarship. Here too cost is a 
factor; but that M L A A publications are so priced to make them 
generally available is a sign o f our commitment to the dif fusion o f 
knowledge throughout the wor ld . (3) 
If the diffusion of knowledge proposed by Gi lman looks sus-
piciously like a one-way process, he hastens to add that the 
American Literature Section of the M L A A welcomes the contri-
butions of the "British, German and Chinese Americanists" who 
prevent it f rom becoming "purely chauvinistic." The interna-
tionalization of the M L A A , G i l m a n reflects finally, is "reflected i n 
the constant reshaping and revitalization of American literary 
studies" (4) . A t its core, then, the M L A A would seem to be 
organized around the promot ion of American scholarship and/ 
or American literature, enhanced by the participation of grateful 
outsiders whose difference "is the oi l that enables the [Ameri-
can] machine to r u n " (4). 
In its construction of a putatively international association 
whose structure and purpose are defined by the boundaries of 
America, Gilman's endorsement of the M L A recalls the myth of 
universal exceptionalism on which the cultural hegemony of the 
U S is symbolically founded. As a k i n d of mission statement for 
the self-identified "primary international society" i n the fields of 
languages, literature, and culture, Gilman's account is all the 
more remarkable for the lack of self-consciousness with which it 
displays its Americocentrism. Accord ing to Said, however, such a 
lack of self-consciousness is typical of an American knowledge 
industry, which, i n its failure to acknowledge the history of Amer-
ican imperialism, colludes i n its perpetuation. For example, "to 
practice anthropology i n the U n i t e d States," as Said points out, is 
not just to be do ing scholarly work investigating "otherness" and 
"dif ference" in a large country; it is to be discussing them i n an 
enormously inf luent ia l and powerful state whose global role is that o f 
a superpower. 
The fetishization and relentless celebration o f "dif ference" and 
"otherness" can therefore be seen as an ominous t rend. I t suggests 
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not only what Jonathan Friedman has called "the spectacularization 
of anthropology" whereby the "textual izat ion" and "cnl tur izat ion" of 
societies occur regardless o f politics and historv, but also the heedless 
appropr iat ion and translation o f the world by a process that for all its 
protestations o f relativism, its displays o f epistemological care and 
technical expertise, cannot easily be distinguished f rom the process 
o f empire. ("Representing the Colonized" 213) 
Said goes on to note "an almost total absence," in contemporary 
writings on anthropology, epistemology, textualization, and "oth-
erness," of any reference to American imperial intervention as a 
"factor affecting theoretical discussions" ( 2 1 3 ) . 
While there are obvious exceptions to this rule, those texts that 
do acknowledge American imperialism tend to be interested less 
in tracing its effects on other cultures than i n redrawing the map 
of America. This problem is acknowledged in the 1993 collec-
tion Cultures of United States Imperialism, edited by A m y Kaplan 
and Donald Pease, which takes as its focus "the multiple histories 
of continental and overseas expansion, conquest, conflict, and 
resistance which have shaped the cultures of the United States 
and the cultures of those it has dominated" (4) . N o t i n g the 
failure of previous revisionist studies of the US to venture beyond 
the (uncontested) borders of the nation, Kaplan argues, in the 
book's introduction, for the need to acknowledge the role of 
political struggles with other cultures and nations in shaping 
the American national identity. Kaplan herself never quite tran-
scends those borders but argues instead for a reformulation of 
the concept of the frontier, a concept which, she suggests, might 
usefully be replaced with the Chicano concept of "the border-
lands." She explains: 
Where the f ront ier implies a model o f center and periphery, which 
confront one another most often in a one-way imposit ion o f power, 
the borderlands are seen as mult id imensional and transterritorial; 
they not only lie at the geographic and polit ical margins o f national 
identity but as often traverse the center o f the metropolis. The 
borderlands l ink the study of ethnicity and immigrat ion inextricablv 
to the study o f international relations and empire. At these borders, 
foreign relations do not take place outside the boundaries o f Amer-
ica, but instead constitute American nationality. (16-17) 
By blurring the distinction between "foreign" and "domestic" i n 
order to defamiliarize the domestic, Kaplan also, seemingly un-
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consciously, domesticates the foreign, which thus risks becom-
ing, l ike Vietnam i n the 1980s, a site from which to project 
anguished interrogations of the American psyche. N o t surpris-
ingly, the bulk of the interrogations which follow Kaplan's intro-
duction are addressed explicitly from within American borders 
— a positionality which is under l ined by the locations of all the 
contributors within U S institutions. While many of the essays 
present convincing critiques of official mythologies of the Amer i -
can nation, the theoretical frame of the collection upholds that 
mythology, suggesting that, i n intellectual terms anyway, America 
is still both universal and exceptional. 
Ironically, of course, it is the very strength of the myth of 
universal exceptional ism which underwrites "America" which 
threatens ultimately to unmoor that sign f rom its original , politi-
cally bound referent. If the power of "America" lies partly i n its 
capacity simultaneously to expropriate and incorporate other 
cultures, it is, paradoxically, through that m u c h vaunted ability to 
surmount political boundaries, that the American myth neces-
sarily culminates i n the death of the American nation. The myth's 
betrayal of the republic for which it nominally stands was clearly 
illustrated dur ing the G u l f War, i n which the US-led invasion of 
Iraq was conducted under the banner of anti-imperialism, a 
banner not unlike the one which the U S waved persistendy 
dur ing the C o l d War. Represented as a means of redeeming, 
morally and militarily, the losses suffered i n the Vietnam War, 
Operat ion Desert Storm was constructed by the government as 
by an eerily obliging media, as an essentially patriotic exercise. 
While cynical commentators argued that the war was really about 
oi l , the fundamental premise that American interests were 
somehow at stake was rarely questioned. As Masao Miyoshi has 
pointed out, however, the economic principles for which the war 
was fought ultimately transcended nation: 
The Uni ted States . . . executed the war, o f course, but as the 
"sharing" o f the mil i tary expenses among the "al l ied nations" dem-
onstrates, the war was being fought on behalf o f the dominant 
corporate structure rather than the Uni ted States, which served after 
all as no more than a mercenary. Does this mean that f r om now on 
the armed forces o f the Uni ted States are in service o f a corporate 
alliance with l i tt le regard for its own people's interests? (743) 
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In the scene outl ined by Miyoshi , the American myth is brought 
home to America, with fatal consequences. If the hypothetical 
scenario offered at the end of the passage seems unlikely, it 
nevertheless represents no more than the logical conclusion of a 
national mythology which rejects the arbitrary political concept 
of state in favour of the "natural" economic concept of free-
d o m . 1 5 If this mythology has not yet brought about the demise of 
America, it has convincingly prophesied the death of all nations 
through the mechanism of a radically decentred neocolonialist 
structure—a structure which postcolonial theory has not yet 
found the language to describe. 
The incapacity of postcolonial literary theory in the face of new 
forms of imperialism is registered in the foundational crisis with 
which the field has been beset for some time, one clear symptom 
of which has been the ongoing debate about the meaning and 
the efficacy of the term "postcolonial." Perhaps the most consis-
tent and salient objection to the term is its impl ied sense of 
premature celebration, the idea that, barring a few vestiges of 
inequity which still need to be i roned out, the world has been 
liberated from imperialist forces. Not only has the liberation 
been conspicuously incomplete, as critics such as Gayatri Spivak 
and Anne McCl intock have observed, but also the very changes 
which are often taken as signs of the dissolution of imperialist 
forces—increased mobility of populations, improved communi-
cations and the consequent burgeoning of a heterogeneous 
global culture—also represent the conditions for the consoli-
dation of the new forms of domination represented by global 
capitalism. Moreover, the discursive strategies of literary post-
colonialism, in their emphasis on liberty, agency, and hybridity, 
are replicated in the legitimating discourse of capitalism, which, 
like postcolonialism, seeks to make f luid what was fixed, to 
eliminate boundaries and to promote diversity. The reluctance 
of postcolonial critics to engage with the morally and concep-
tually awkward imbrication of postcolonialist and capitalist dis-
courses is reflected in the conspicuous absence of the Uni ted 
States from contemporary postcolonial criticism. As Lawrence 
Buell points out in "American Literary Emergence as Post-
colonial Phenomenon," the American situation reveals a worry-
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ing fracture i n the progressivist logic of postcolonial theoretical 
discourse: 
I t begins to appear . . . that the old-world tropes whose ingestion by 
the new-world citizen marks his or her cultural subordinat ion can in 
turn become reactivated, whether on the f ront ier wi th in one's own 
borders or on the frontiers b e y o n d , . . . to reproduce new versions o f 
cultural subordinat ion. This . . . is not the sole or inevitable conse-
quence of postcolonialism, only the most disturbing, but it is by the 
same token the most dramatic reminder o f the quixot ism o f posit ing 
a firm boundary between a postcolonial era and what follows it. 
(436) 
If, Buel l seems to be suggesting, America can be read as the 
entelechy of postcolonial possibility, it also embodies the un-
severable l ink j o i n i n g the progressive "post" to the obdurate 
"colonial , " the latter of which lies dormant i n the new-world 
citizen, immune to the forces of anti-imperial resistance. Rather 
than destroying the old-world tropes of subordination, the "new-
world" rhetoric of l iberation and transculturation redeploys 
those tropes i n a benignly disguised form, which carries and 
legitimates the force of American cultural hegemony. T o engage 
with that force is to take on what Graham Pechey identifies as the 
central paradox of postcolonialism—"that it takes anticolonial 
struggles to produce neocolonial conditions" ( 1 5 2 ) . A n d , it 
could further be argued, it takes neocolonial conditions to pro-
duce the academic discourse of "the postcolonial." 
Throughout this paper, the word "postcolonial," l ike the word 
"America , " has sl ipped uneasily back and forth between two 
different registers. L ike "America , " "postcolonial" has a mun-
dane, historical sense, as well as a more ideologically charged 
discursive one. Postcolonial critics are generally careful to distin-
guish between the two, as, for example, do Ashcroft, Griffiths 
and Ti f f in i n The Empire Writes Back, not ing that "postcolonial" 
may be used to describe "the culture affected by the imperial 
process," as well as a k i n d of discursive activity, "the new cross-
cultural criticism," which is characterized primarily by its resis-
tance to colonialist ideologies ( 2 ) . As A r i f Di r l ik has pointed out, 
however, the critical erasure of the connection between its two 
fields of reference also effaces the provenance of "the post-
colonial" i n a strategically misleading way. For Dir l ik , the post-
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colonial "begins," as a term with critical currency, at the moment 
when T h i r d World intellectuals arrived in First World academe 
( 3 2 9 ) . In other words, it is only through the mechanism of a 
global knowledge industry and its shifting human resource re-
quirements that the critical discourse of postcolonialism comes 
into being. A n d it is a condit ion of that coming-into-being that 
the term is severed from the historical experience :t putatively 
addresses and reconstituted by such cultural institutions as the 
M L A A Whatever its diverse cultural roots, "the postcolonial" has 
come, in its most highly prized incarnation, to bear the indelible 
label "Made i n the U . S . A . " 1 6 
"Postcolonial critics," Dir l ik observes, "have engaged in valid 
criticism of past forms of ideological hegemony but have had 
little to say about its contemporary figurations" ( 3 5 6 ) . T o focus 
postcolonial critique on the US is not only to illuminate an 
important aspect of contemporary figurations of hegemony but 
also to acknowledge the conditions of that critique's production. 
It is finally only through the continual scrutiny of the terms of its 
own mythology, its inclusions and its exclusions, that postcolonial 
criticism can engage usefully with the new forms of power that 
are emerging at the end of the American century. 
N O T E S 
1 If the goal of Lord Macaulay's infamous 1835 Minute on Education, advocating 
the production, through education, of "a class of persons Indian in blood and 
colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals and in intellect" (249), was 
never fully achieved, the spirit behind it proved surprisingly resilient. 
Narasimhaiah cites the case of the well-known Indian journalist who explained in 
a university lecture in the early 1970s his criterion for the choice of books to 
review: "he would take a quick look at the imprint of a book on the spine and 
unless it was published by some better known British or American firm he 
wouldn't touch it with a barge pole, much less consider it for review in his 
columns" (xvi). Dale convincingly demonstrates the operation of similar criteria 
in both curriculum and hiring patterns in Australia up until the mid 1970s. 
'-' While Hulme makes a convincing case for the relevance of the US in discussions 
of the postcolonial, he does not provide a detailed analysis of the theoretical 
implications of "including America" in the postcolonial field as it is currently 
constituted. 
: ! Perhaps the most significant exception to the prevailing tendency is the work of 
Edward Said, which has come increasingly to focus on the neocolonial influence 
of the US. Lawrence Buell takes a different tack, looking at nineteenth-century 
American literature in the context of its resistance to British cultural coloniza-
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tion. More recently, Kaplan points out in the introduction to Cultures of United 
States Imperialism that 
the absence of the United States in the postcolonial study of culture and 
imperialism curiously reproduces American exceptionalism from without. The 
United States either is absorbed into a general notion of "the West," repre-
sented by Europe, or it stands for a monolithic West. ( 17) 
As noted below, the essays in this collection are intelligible not so much in the 
context of critical debates about postcolonialism and neocolonialism as they are 
in the context of revisionist American literary history. Nevertheless, the connec-
tion which Kaplan draws between two formerly separate fields signifies, at the very 
least, a growing recognition of the useful insights to be gained by viewing the 
United States through a postcolonial lens. 
See in particular "Third World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism," 
which appeared in Social Text in 1 9 8 6 . A slightly revised version was published a 
year later, retitled "World Literature in an Age of Multinational Capitalism"—an 
interesting shift in terms of reference, which Jameson does not fully explain in the 
revised essay. 
In 1 9 8 5 , acting on the recommendation of Gregory Newell, Reagan's Secretary of 
State for international organization affairs, the US withdrew from UNESCO, 
criticizing the organization for among other things the "irrelevant politicization 
of issues.' Then, as if to confirm UNESCO's charges of American excesses, Newell 
went on to venture that 
given the fact that neither culture, commerce, nor world science can proceed 
meaningfully without the participation of US nationals and American institu-
tions, cooperative arrangements [through other channels] . . . will surely be 
activated—and on a healthy non-ideological basis (qtd. in Preston 1 7 2 ) . 
See Schiller's Mass Communications and the American Empire, Communication 
and Cultural Domination and "National Sovereignty and International 
Communication." 
A more recent example of the US government's conception of the strategic 
significance of culture appears in an interview in Business Week with House 
Speaker, Newt Gingrich. In response to a question about "the most important 
thing you learned in your first few months of power," Gingrich says: "The key is 
leading the culture, not leading the government." Change culture, Gingrich says, 
and "everything falls in place behind it" ( 3 5 ) . 
For recent critiques of Schiller, see Frederick Buell's National Culture and the New 
Global System ( 3 2 9 - 3 2 ) , Tomlinson's Cultural Imperialism, and Trend's "Nation-
alities, Pedagogies and Media." A third issue, slightly less relevant to the current 
discussion, but considered in depth by all three of the studies cited above, is the 
extent to which nationalism becomes an issue in discussions of cultural sover-
eignty. In short, "the heterogeneous and changing nature of nations raises the 
question of who is authorized to speak on behalf of a national identity and when" 
(Trend 9 3 ) . If nations are not adequate representations of collective interests, 
then the argument against cultural imperialism as a threat to "national sover-
eignty" becomes suspect. Moreover, having acknowledged the emptiness of the 
term "nation," one can legitimately ask how an imaginary construct—the U S — 
can exercise domination. John Tomlinson addresses the question by noting the 
difference between an onlologtcal disunity in the imagined community of America 
and a practical integrity as a cultural force in the world. The mainstream white 
culture which dominates black, Hispanic and native Americans within the nation 
largely defines the face of America as a hegemonic global force. "McDonald's," 
writes Tomlinson, 
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is American culture in a way that no New York clam house, pizza parlour, Jewish 
deli or chop suev restaurant can ever be. So we can reasonably speak of a 
hegemonic American national culture as experienced from outside.... Clearly 
such aspects of perceived .American culture may be distinguished from a more 
complex "realm" in which the symbolic images exist in a contested or contra-
dictory form, or at least alongside other "versions" of American culture. These 
images exist as what Barthes might have called the myth of America. But this 
"mythical" nature does not mean they do not exist as a reed cultural threat (75). 
B The construction of this kind of split risks reinscribing the image of the develop-
ing world as the site of a pure unified culture as opposed to the hybridity of the 
West. As Frederick Buell, following numerous postcolonial theorists, has pointed 
out, however, "the Third World has been incorporated into the world system for a 
long time. It has been 'impure' and 'penetrated' for centuries, having been 
shaped and reshaped bv colonial circumstances for more than four hundred 
years" (3). Hybridity, in other words, has been a feature of life in the Third World 
long before it became fashionable in the West. 
1 ( 1 Ahmad draws a parallel between the supermarket and the similarly American 
innovation of New Criticism, suggesting that the 
New Critical idea that each literary text constituted a self-enclosed and suffi-
cient unit for analysis rehearsed, in a peculiarly displaced way, this ideological 
assertion of the supermarket that each commodity carried its own text within 
itself, with no reference to the origins which in fact saturate it or to the other 
commodity-texts which surround it. (128-29) 
According to this formula, an increasing receptivity, in the US, to literature from 
different cultures can be read as a reflection of the same hunger for variety that is 
served by the growing presence, in upmarket food stores, of "house" (read 
"domesticated") brands of ethnic food. 
1 1 Hall qualifies his argument about the pervasiveness of the impulse towards what 
he tenus "the global post-modern," noting that its principles are by no means 
uncontested. The phenomenon he is describing, he explains. 
is not a unitary regime because it is still in tension within itself with an older, 
embattled, more corporate, more unitary, more homogeneous conception of 
its own identity. That struggle is being fought out within itself. . . in American 
society, in American culture, those two voices speak at one and the same time. 
The voice of infinite pleasurable consumption and what 1 call "the exotic 
cuisine" and, on the other hand, the voice of the moral majority, the more 
fundamental and traditional conservative ideas. (32) 
It might be argued that the forces of the global postmodern are paradoxically 
strengthened bv the persistence of these reactionary voices, against which the 
enthusiastic celebration of exotic cuisine seems positively progressive. 
As MacCannell explains it, the tourist's conception of his or her relationship to 
other, more "primitive" cultures is based on a moral fantasy of the transcendence 
of economic exploitation. He describes the tourist's "fable" as follows: 
The return on the lour . . . is to make the tourist a real hero of alterity. It is his 
coming into contact with and experience of the ultra-primitive which gives him 
his status. But this has not cost the primitives anything. Indeed, they, too, may 
have gained from it. Taking someone's picture doesn't cost them anything, not 
in any Western commercial sense, yet the picture has value. This picture has no 
value for the primitive, vet the tourist pays for the right to take pictures. The 
"primitive" receives something for nothing and benefits beyond this. Doesn't 
the fame of certain primitives, and even respect for them, actually increase 
when the tourist carries their pictures back to the West? It seems to be the most 
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perfect realization so far of the capitalist economists' dream of everyone getting 
rich together. ("Cannibalism" 2 9 ) 
The same argument might, of course, be made for the cultural theorist. 
1 3 See, for example, Abbeele's "Sightseers: The Tourist as Theorist," as well as 
Morris's commentary on Abbeele in "At Henry Parks Motel." While he does not 
employ the metaphor of tourism explicitly, Clifford's "Notes on Theory and 
Travel," can be read as an endorsement of a theoretical approach based on the 
stance of an enlightened tourist, sensitive to both the significance and the 
provisionality of origins and destinations, bell hooks notes some of the limitations 
of Clifford's argument, pointing out that "travel" is "not a word that can be easily 
evoked to talk about the Middle Passage, the Trail of Tears, the landing of the 
Chinese immigrants at Ellis Island, the forced relocation of Japanese Americans, 
the plight of the homeless" ( 3 4 3 ) . 
1 4 Some of these barriers, while not entirely within the MLA's control, effectively 
restrict overseas participation in the organization. For example, while overseas 
members are eligible to vote for executive members, they generally do not receive 
the ballots until after the election is over. A more significant problem for overseas 
members is the financial difficulty faced by many who seek to attend the annual 
convention. Gilman points out that some funding is available: the United States 
Information Agency, for example, "provides some Americanists from throughout 
the world funding to attend the convention" ( 3 ; emphasis added). 
1 5 The tension at the core of the national mythology assumed palpable form during 
the 1996 Republican primaries in a surprising show of support for Pat Buchanan 
who expanded his traditional focus on the evils of homosexuality and immigra-
tion to address the issue of American jobs lost to the forces of globalization. 
1 6 Brydon makes this point in an essay which also takes issue with Time magazine's 
version of postcolonialism, suggesting that in the face of the global/American 
thrust of this movement the now unfashionable "Commonwealth studies" may 
offer surprising strategies of radical resistance ( 104) . 
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